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Abstract
Background: Many systems for routine public health surveillance rely on centralized collection of
potentially identifiable, individual, identifiable personal health information (PHI) records. Although
individual, identifiable patient records are essential for conditions for which there is mandated
reporting, such as tuberculosis or sexually transmitted diseases, they are not routinely required for
effective syndromic surveillance. Public concern about the routine collection of large quantities of
PHI to support non-traditional public health functions may make alternative surveillance methods
that do not rely on centralized identifiable PHI databases increasingly desirable.
Methods: The National Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance Demonstration Program (NDP) is
an example of one alternative model. All PHI in this system is initially processed within the secured
infrastructure of the health care provider that collects and holds the data, using uniform software
distributed and supported by the NDP. Only highly aggregated count data is transferred to the
datacenter for statistical processing and display.
Results: Detailed, patient level information is readily available to the health care provider to
elucidate signals observed in the aggregated data, or for ad hoc queries. We briefly describe the
benefits and disadvantages associated with this distributed processing model for routine automated
syndromic surveillance.
Conclusion: For well-defined surveillance requirements, the model can be successfully deployed
with very low risk of inadvertent disclosure of PHI – a feature that may make participation in
surveillance systems more feasible for organizations and more appealing to the individuals whose
PHI they hold. It is possible to design and implement distributed systems to support non-routine
public health needs if required.
Background
Timely identification and subsequent reaction to a public
health emergency requires routine collection of appropri-
ate and accurate data about the occurrence and location of
cases of illness. There is substantial interest in using rou-
tinely collected electronic health records to support both
the detection of unusual clusters of public health events
and the response to public health threats detected by
other means. Such data are also useful to reduce an initial
alert level, if it is clear that no unusual illness clusters exist
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in a community. Ideally, such systems operate automati-
cally and include sensitive and specific statistical surveil-
lance software and alerting systems. These are often
referred to as syndromic surveillance systems [1,2],
because they typically rely on the non-specific signs and
symptoms that may provide the earliest evidence of a seri-
ous public health threat, such as anthrax or SARS.
Many syndromic surveillance systems gather potentially
identifiable, individual patient-level encounter records.
These records are typically collected without name or
address, but they do contain enough identifiers to allow
re-identification in some circumstances. The potential for
re-identification is greatest when records are collected
from ambulatory settings or health systems that supply a
unique identifier that allows the very useful identification
of repeated visits over time. The risk of disclosing sensitive
information that can be linked to the individual also
increases when the health care facility provides more than
occasional care.
In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act [3] (HIPAA) specifically exempts trans-
fer, use and retention of identifiable electronic personal
health information (PHI) to support public health activi-
ties. This exemption also applies to syndromic surveil-
lance activities, although HIPAA was developed before
large volumes of such data concerning individuals who
are not suspected of having a reportable condition were
being used for public health purposes in the absence of
any known public health emergency. Despite the exemp-
tion, data providers may be unwilling to offer identifiable
data for surveillance purposes in the face of increasing
awareness of the potential costs of inadvertent disclosure
or inappropriate use of PHI. Additionally, their patients
may object to their providing it. These concerns are com-
mon to many developed countries and under these cir-
cumstances, designs that minimise the risk of inadvertent
disclosure may be needed in order to gain the cooperation
of data custodians, for surveillance systems to be feasible.
The focus of this paper is on one such design, in which ini-
tial data aggregation is performed to decrease the risk of
any PHI being inadvertently disclosed, before the aggre-
gate data is centralised for subsequent statistical analysis.
Although the system we describe is currently operating in
the United States and many of the implementation details
are specific to that context, some of the conceptual issues
we describe and some of the lessons we have learned may
be directly relevant to public health practice in other
countries.
While it is possible to centrally collate and process de-
identified records, there is a potential problem with statis-
tical inference if multiple records from the same individ-
ual are not distinguished. This problem arises because
many statistical analysis techniques applicable to surveil-
lance, such as Generalised Linear Mixed Models [4]
(GLMM), depend on the assumption that observations
are statistically independent. Inference based on this
assumption using ambulatory care encounter data will
likely be biased if the model cannot distinguish observa-
tions from multiple encounters during a single course of
illness from a single individual patient. Although the
extent of this bias has not been quantified, the problem is
clearly illustrated by real data. In more than half of the
individuals with multiple lower respiratory syndrome
encounters over a four year period from one large ambu-
latory care practice, a second encounter with the same syn-
drome was noted less than 21 days after the first
encounter [1]. Our approach to this problem of statistical
independence is to aggregate multiple encounters from a
single individual into "episodes" of illness, and is
described in more detail below. Reliably automating this
aggregation requires that every patient's records be
uniquely identifiable.
To support the National Demonstration Bioterrorism Sur-
veillance Program (NDP), we developed a system in
which no PHI leaves the immediate control of the data
provider, and only aggregate data is transferred to the
datacenter [2,5]. Each data provider performs initial
aggregation of the PHI within their own existing, secured
data processing environment, producing data that is
aggregated beyond the point where any individual patient
is identifiable. Since data processing is distributed to the
site of data collection rather than being performed at one
central location, we describe this as a distributed process-
ing surveillance system. Although this particular aspect of
our work has briefly been mentioned in previous publica-
tions [1,2,4-6], we present it in greater detail here, because
we believe that it represents a potentially valuable alterna-
tive surveillance system design option that deserves more
explanation and wider debate than it has received to date.
Discussion
The basic principle of distributed processing is simple.
Rather than collecting all needed identifiable, individual
PHI records centrally for statistical processing, all PHI is
pre-processed remotely, and remains secured, under the
direct control of the data provider. Only aggregate data are
transferred to the central datacenter for additional statisti-
cal processing, signal detection, display and distribution.
At an appropriate level of aggregation, the risk of inadvert-
ent PHI disclosure becomes very small, and may prove
acceptable to data custodians and to individual patients.
Although this risk is never completely absent, it is cer-
tainly decreased in aggregate data, making this approach
far more acceptable to data providers in our experience,
than the more traditional approach of centralized collec-
tion of directly identifiable PHI.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:235 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/235
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Centralized processing models for public health 
surveillance
Before describing our distributed system, we briefly review
the more familiar model of centralized aggregation and
processing of PHI for surveillance. In the more traditional
type of system, individual patient records, often contain-
ing potentially identifiable information, such as date of
birth and exact or approximate home address, are trans-
ferred, usually in electronic form, preferably through
some secured method, to a central secured repository,
where statistical tools can be used to develop and refine
surveillance procedures. One of the main benefits of this
data-processing model is that the software and statistical
methods can be changed relatively easily to accommodate
changes in requirements, because they only need to be
changed at the one central location where analysis is tak-
ing place. As long as appropriate details have been cap-
tured for each individual encounter of interest, the raw
data can be re-coded or manipulated in different ways.
Only one suite of analysis code is needed, and because it
is maintained at a single, central location, costs for
upgrading and maintenance are small. Inadvertent disclo-
sure of PHI is always a potential risk with centralized sys-
tems. Even where minimally identifiable data are stored
in each record, the probability of being able to unambig-
uously identify an individual increases as multiple, poten-
tially linkable records for that individual accrue over time.
Distributed data processing by the NDP
Rather than gathering identifiable PHI information into a
central repository for analysis, a distributed system moves
some of the initial data processing, such as counting
aggregated episodes of care (see below), to the site where
the data is being collected. This aggregation minimizes the
number of individuals who have access to PHI and dimin-
ishes the risk of inadvertent PHI disclosure from the sur-
Distributed processing model and data flow Figure 1
Distributed processing model and data flow.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:235 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/235
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veillance system, while still allowing effective use of the
information of interest. The focus of this report is on the
model used to collect surveillance data while providing
maximum protection for PHI, so the statistical methods
we use in the NDP, which have been described elsewhere
[4] are not discussed further here.
Data flows for the NDP are illustrated in Figure 1. Data
pre-processing, detection of repeated visits by the same
patient for the same syndrome, and data aggregation is
performed using a custom software package, written,
maintained, and distributed by the NDP datacenter. Data
providers maintain complete control of the security of
their own PHI and also maintain control over the opera-
tion of the data processing software, which runs on one of
their secured workstations. Since the pre-processing takes
place within a secured environment under the control of
the data provider, there is no need for the individual
patient identifiers to be divulged to the datacenter. In the
case of the NDP [5], the only data that is centrally collated
consists of counts of the number of new episodes of spe-
cific syndromes over a defined time period (currently set
at each 24 hour period ending at midnight), by geo-
graphic area (currently, 5-digit zip code area). More
detailed definitions of "syndromes" and "new episodes"
are provided below. Table 1 illustrates the data transferred
from each data provider each day to the datacenter for sta-
tistical processing, reporting and alerting. Note that the
although this data does not contain any obvious identifi-
ers such as date of birth or gender, there is always a risk
that a specific individual might be identifiable using addi-
tional data, and that this risk is greatest in zip codes with
very small populations.
All source code required to build the data processing soft-
ware is provided to the data provider at installation and
whenever the software is updated, so that the local infor-
mation services staff can check that there are no "back-
doors" or other ways the distributed software could
compromise the security of their systems. All information
transferred to the datacenter is stored in text files (in XML
format) and can be readily accessed by local staff to ensure
that no PHI is being transmitted.
Aggregation – definition of syndromes of interest
Participating data providers have near real-time ICD9
codes for every encounter, usually assigned by clinicians
at the time of the encounter. Since much acute infectious
disease manifests as broad suites of nonspecific symp-
toms, we monitor 13 syndromes – Respiratory, Lower gas-
tro-intestinal (GI), Upper GI, Neurological, Botulism-like,
Fever, Hemorrhagic, Skin lesions, Lymphatic, Rash,
Shock-death, Influenza-like illness and SARS-like illness.
All syndromes except Influenza-like illness and SARS-like
illness were defined by a working group led by CDC and
Department of Defense [7]. Individual ICD9 codes are
used to aggregate encounters into one of these 13 syn-
dromes. The definitions (ICD9 code lists) of 11 of these
syndromes are available [7]. The definitions comprising
the other two syndromes were developed in consultation
with both CDC and the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health.
Encounters and episodes of a syndrome
Our surveillance algorithms [4] require statistically inde-
pendent observations and are based on new episodes of
syndromes. Our goal was to distinguish health care
encounters that were related to ongoing care for any given
episode of acute illness from the initial encounter that
indicated the start of a new episode of a syndrome of
interest. The derivation of the specific method for identi-
fying first encounters for an episode of illness has been
described in more detail elsewhere [1]. We define a new
episode to begin at the first encounter after at least a 42-
day encounter-free interval for that specific patient and
that specific syndrome. If there has been any encounter
for that specific syndrome for the same individual patient
within the previous 42 days, the current encounter is
regarded as part of the usual ongoing care for the original
encounter that signalled the start of an episode of illness
of that syndrome. The start of a new episode for a different
syndrome can occur during ongoing encounters for any
Table 1: Example of data elements transferred to the datacenter (synthetic data)
Syndrome Encounter date Organization Zip code Town Date of receipt Count
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 94565 Pittsburg CA 2/2/2006 7
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 95209 Stockton CA 2/2/2006 3
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 95632 Galt CA 2/2/2006 2
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 94509 Antioch CA 2/2/2006 6
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 94112 San Francisco CA 2/2/2006 3
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 95219 Stockton CA 2/2/2006 2
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 95122 San Jose CA 2/2/2006 3
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 94545 Hayward CA 2/2/2006 6
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 95825 Sacramento CA 2/2/2006 1
GI:lower 2/1/2006 KPNC 94806 San Pablo CA 2/2/2006 3BMC Public Health 2006, 6:235 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/235
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given specific syndrome – ongoing encounters during an
episode are counted as new episodes only if they are out-
side (i.e. at least 42 days since the last encounter)of an
existing episode of the matching syndrome. As will be
described later, all ongoing encounters within any syn-
drome are recorded, and are visible through reports under
the control of the data provider, but they do not contrib-
ute to the counts that are sent to the datacentre for analy-
sis. All of this processing requires consistent and unique
patient identifiers for all encounters. We use the local
patient master index record number for this purpose in
the software that we provide, but these identifiers are not
required once the processing is complete, and they remain
under the complete control of the providers.
Standard input file formats
The distributed software requires the data providers to
extract information about encounters of interest (daily, in
our case) and convert it into the uniform format used by
our distributed software. This kind of uniform representa-
tion is required for any multi-source surveillance system
and is not peculiar to the distributed model we have
adopted. In practice, we found that data providers could
easily produce text files containing data as comma sepa-
rated values in the format which we specified, and which
the distributed software has been written to process. How-
ever, this requires dedicated programming effort that was
supported with resources from the NDP grant.
Data transfer
Our project receives support from the CDC, so we are
required to comply with relevant CDC standards.
Although the data being transferred to the datacenter is
arguably not identifiable PHI because of the high level of
aggregation, we use the Public Health Information Net-
work Messaging System [8] (PHINMS), a freely available,
secure, data transfer software suite developed by the CDC,
to transfer aggregate data. A PHINMS server operates at
the datacenter and each data provider operates a PHINMS
client, using a security certificate supplied by the data-
center for encryption and authentication. PHINMS allows
fully automated operation at both the datacenter and at
each data provider. PHINMS communicates over an
encrypted channel and usually requires no special modifi-
cation to the data provider firewall, since it is only ever
initiated by an outgoing request (the data provider always
initiates the transfer of new data) and uses the same fire-
wall port and protocol (SSL on port 443) as commercially
encrypted services such as internet banking. PHINMS is
reasonably robust to temporary connectivity problems, as
it will try to resend all messages in the queue until they are
delivered. Data transmission is one of the least problem-
atic aspects of maintaining this system. We provide auto-
matic installation software and it runs more or less
instantaneously and transparently, without intervention
in our experience. No training is needed as the process is
fully automated.
Data representation and application development 
language
All data is transferred to the datacenter in the form of
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) since this is a flexible
machine-readable representation and is easy to integrate
with PHINMS. We used the Python [9] language for the
development of the distributed software package. This
choice was partially motivated by the fact that Python is
an open-source language and thus freely distributable,
partly by our very positive experience with Python as a
general purpose application development language, and
partially because in our experience, Python can be
installed, and applications reliably run without any
change to source code, on all common operating systems
(including Linux, Unix, Macintosh and Windows), mak-
ing it easy for the datacenter to provide support for sys-
tems other than Windows PC's. It is also a language with
extensive support for standards such as XML, and securely
encrypted internet connections. In addition, our existing
web infrastructure has been built with the open-source
Zope [10] web application framework, which is written
mostly in Python.
Reports available and benefits to data providers
A major design goal for our distributed software was that
it should offer potentially useful functions for the data
provider. This was motivated by our desire to encourage
data providers to look at their own data in different ways
that might not only help them manage the data more effi-
ciently, but might also help them to more easily identify
errors. In our experience, the task of maintaining a system
like the one we have developed is far more attractive and
interesting to the staff responsible at each participating
institution if they gain some tangible, useful and immedi-
ate benefits. In addition, easy access to data flowing
through our software is useful for ensuring transparency
and to facilitate security auditing by each data provider.
The distributed software optionally creates reports that
show one line of detailed information about each of the
patient encounters that was counted for the aggregate data
for each day's processing. These reports are termed "line
lists" and were designed to support detailed reporting of
encounter level data, so that a data provider can quickly
make this information available in response to a public
health need. Two versions are available, one with and one
without the most specific identifying details, such as
patient name and address. These standard line lists are
used most often to support requests by public health
agencies for additional information about the individual
cases that contribute to clusters identified in the aggregate
data. These lists are never transmitted to the datacenterBMC Public Health 2006, 6:235 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/235
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but may be used to support public health officials investi-
gating a potential event.
Current capacity of the NDP to respond to public health 
needs
When unexpectedly high counts of particular syndromes
are detected in geographically defined areas, the data-
center automatically generates electronic alerts, which are
automatically routed to appropriate public health author-
ities. For example, in Massachusetts, electronic messages
are automatically sent to the Massachusetts Alert Network
within minutes of detection, where they are automatically
and immediately forwarded to the appropriate Public
Health personnel for follow up. Available alert delivery
methods in the Massachusetts system range from email
through to an automated telephone text-to-speech deliv-
ery system. Responders can configure the alert delivery
method for each type of alert they have subscribed to. This
alerting system is independent of our distributed system,
but in practice, the ready availability of reports in elec-
tronic format containing both fully and partially identifi-
able clinical data for all cases comprising any particular
period or syndrome makes the task of the clinical
responder much simpler whenever a query is received
from a public health official. Electronic reports, contain-
ing clinical information and optionally, full identifiers for
all encounters can be generated as required, at the pro-
vider's site, from where they can immediately be made
available to public health agencies. In the NDP's current
operational mode (see Figure 1), a public health official
calls a designated clinical responder to obtain this infor-
mation.
The reports have one line per encounter and can be sorted
and culled to create subset lists of only the cases contrib-
uting to a particular alert. The original, full line lists are
created in two forms. The fully identified version contains
all elements deemed of possible utility to the responder,
namely: syndrome; date of encounter; whether the
encounter was new or a follow-up to one occurring within
the previous 6 weeks; date of the previous encounter, if
any; date of birth; sex; town and zip code of residence;
type of encounter (regular office visit, urgent care visit,
phone call); temperature, if recorded; text corresponding
to diagnostic codes assigned by the clinician; tests
ordered, in broad categories; physician ID; and medical
record number (Table 2). The "narrow" version, which
contains fewer identifiers, provides each patient's five-year
age group instead of date of birth and does not include the
physician ID or medical record number (Table 3). At the
provider's discretion, the clinical responder can provide
the "narrow" list corresponding to the cases of interest to
the public health department. If on this basis public
health officials decide that further investigation is war-
ranted, they can call the clinical provider and request a
review of medical records, identifying the cases of interest
by date and an index number (unique within date) in the
narrow line list. The clinician finds the medical record
number by looking up the date and index number in the
wide line list and then accesses the record itself through
the usual HMO-specific means. Resources to support clin-
ical responders were provided through our NDP grant to
participating data providers.
It would be straightforward to send detailed lists of
encounters that are part of clusters directly to the relevant
health department whenever the datacenter detects an
event and sends an automated alert to a health depart-
ment. We have not implemented this feature because all
the participating health plans prefer to have an on-site
clinical responder participate in the initial case evaluation
with the public health agency. It would also be simple to
allow designated public health personnel to initiate
requests for specific line lists, even when no alert has
occurred. Public health officials may, on occasion, wish to
inspect the line lists to search for specific diagnoses that
do not occur frequently enough to trigger an alert for their
syndrome, but may be meaningful in the context of infor-
mation that arises from other sources.
Enhancing the utility of distributed data-processing for 
public health surveillance
Although not currently implemented in the NDP, it
would be feasible to allow a remote user to perform ad-
hoc queries on the encounter data maintained by the
health plan. Examples of these queries include focused
assessment of disease conditions affecting subsets of the
population or specific diagnoses. This type of direct query
capability is currently used at some of the same participat-
ing health plans to support the CDC's Vaccine Safety
Datalink project [11], a surveillance system that supports
post-marketing surveillance of vaccine safety [12].
Current status, feasibility, advantages and generalisability
This distributed data model supports active surveillance
and alerting of public health agencies in five states with 7
participating data providers. The system has proven to be
workable, and it supports the syndromic surveillance
needs of the participating health departments. There are
fixed costs such as programming to produce the standard
input files, installation and training, associated with add-
ing each new data provider, so we have focussed our
efforts on large group practices providing ambulatory care
with substantial daily volumes of encounters, completely
paperless electronic medical record systems, and substan-
tial technical resources, since these enable us to capture
large volumes of transactions with each installation. Rela-
tively large numbers of encounters are needed to ensure
that estimates from statistical modelling are robust.
Applying a distributed architecture to surveillance fromB
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Table 2: Sample fully identified line list. (Synthetic data for purposes of illustration).
Index Syndrome Visit date Visit Comment Age group Gender City Zip code Event type Temp DOB Provider ID Medical Rec# ICD9 codes Tests 
ordered
18 Botulism-like 2/17/2006 New!! 35 to 39 M Winchester 01890 Visit 0 6/3/1968 E263 234839 Visual 
Disturbances;spec
None
20 Botulism-like 2/17/2006 Last Visit 02/14/2006 5 to 12 F Medford 02155 Visit 0 19/06/1999 E126 2623357 Diplopia None
51 Fever 2/17/2006 Last Visit 01/31/2006 1 to 4 F North Reading 01864 Visit 98.9 6/1/2003 11646 70462348 Viral Infections 
Unspecified;Unspecified 
Viral Infection
CSF
52 Fever 2/17/2006 New!! 60 to 64 M Arlington 02476 Visit 97.4 14/01/1942 P036 70394015 Viral Infections 
Unspecified; Unspecified 
Viral Infection
None
107 GI:lower 2/17/2006 New!! 1 to 4 M Ayer 01432 Tel. call 0 13/02/2003 C241 1696943 Abdominal Pain, 
unspecif.; Shortness Of 
Breath
None
108 GI:lower 2/17/2006 New!! 13 to 19 F Burlington 01803 Visit 98.2 15/11/1991 11646 70463731 Gastroenteritis/
colitis N
None
378 Neurological 2/17/2006 Last Visit 02/10/2006 40 to 44 M Wilmington 01887 Tel. call 0 1/8/1961 18503 70458803 Convulsions, Other None
379 Neurological 2/17/2006 New!! 55 to 59 M Lowell 01854 Visit 0 29/05/1947 F609 1635454 Headache None
411 Rash 2/17/2006 New!! 50 to 54 M Weymouth 02188 Tel. call 0 15/11/1953 19217 70363320 Herpes Simplex Nos None
434 Respiratory 2/17/2006 New!! 13 to 19 F Hyde Park 02136 Visit 98.1 20/10/1988 18461 489441 Bronchitis Acute;Cough None
435 Respiratory 2/17/2006 Last Visit 01/30/2006 40 to 44 F Belmont 02478 Visit 0 6/9/1963 P326 392719 Mononucleosis, 
Infectious
None
Note: This report is kept by the health-care organization. Some or all records can be shared with the health department when a cluster requires follow-up of individual cases. Temp = patient temperature if 
recorded.B
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Table 3: Sample limited identity line list. (Synthetic data for purposes of illustration).
Index Syndrome Visit date Visit comment Age Group Gender City Zip code Event type Temp ICD9 codes Tests 
ordered
18 Botulism-like 2/17/2006 New!! 35 to 39 M Winchester 01890 Visit 0 Visual Disturbances;spec None
20 Botulism-like 2/17/2006 Last Visit 02/14/2006 5 to 12 F Medford 02155 Visit 0 Diplopia None
51 Fever 2/17/2006 Last Visit 01/31/2006 1 to 4 F North Reading 01864 Visit 98.9 Viral Infections Unspecified; Unspecified Viral InfectionO t h e r  
cultures
52 Fever 2/17/2006 New!! 60 to 64 M Arlington 02476 Visit 97.4 Viral Infections Unspecified; Unspecified Viral Infection None
107 GI:lower 2/17/2006 New!! 1 to 4 M Ayer 01432 Tel. call 0 Abdominal Pain, unspecif.; Shortness of Breath None
108 GI:lower 2/17/2006 New!! 13 to 19 F Burlington 01803 Visit 98.2 Gastroenteritis/colitis N None
378 Neurological 2/17/2006 Last Visit 02/10/2006 40 to 44 M Wilmington 01887 Tel. call 0 Convulsions, Other None
379 Neurological 2/17/2006 New!! 55 to 59 M Lowell 01854 Visit 0 Headache None
411 Rash 2/17/2006 New!! 50 to 54 M Weymouth 02188 Tel. call 0 Herpes Simplex Nos None
434 Respiratory 2/17/2006 New!! 13 to 19 F Hyde Park 02136 Visit 98.1 Bronchitis Acute;Cough None
435 Respiratory 2/17/2006 Last Visit 01/30/2006 40 to 44 F Belmont 02478 Visit 0 Mononucleosis, Infectious None
436 Respiratory 2/17/2006 New!! 80+ M Middleton 01949 Tel. call 0 Strep Sore Throat None
Note: These can be shared with a health department to determine whether it is worthwhile to follow up individual cases, in which case full identifiers can also be provided. Temp = patient temperature if 
recordedBMC Public Health 2006, 6:235 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/235
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multiple smaller practices may enable appropriately large
numbers of encounters to be gathered, but may prove
infeasible because of costs and lack of appropriate inter-
nal technical support and because of heterogeneity in the
way ICD9 codes are recorded and assigned by each data
provider. Once the programming for standard input files
is completed, installation and training take approximately
one day total, usually spread out over the first two weeks.
Nearly all problems are related to providers getting the
standard file format contents exactly right, and to transfer-
ring these to the
The distributed architecture currently in use by the NDP
allows clinical facilities to provide the aggregated infor-
mation needed to support rapid and efficient syndromic
surveillance, while maintaining control over the identifia-
ble PHI and clinical data that supports this surveillance.
The system provides support for the clinical providers to
respond quickly to public health requests for detailed
information when this is needed. In our experience, such
requests involve only a tiny fraction of the data that would
be transferred in a centralized surveillance model, provid-
ing adequate support for public health with minimal risk
of inadvertent disclosure of identifiable PHI.
We believe this design, in which patients' clinical data
remains with their own provider under most circum-
stances, while public health needs are still effectively met,
conforms to the public's expectations, and so will be eas-
ier to justify if these surveillance systems come under pub-
lic scrutiny. Many of the details of our approach are
specific to the United States context, but the general prin-
ciple of using distributed processing to minimise the risk
of inadvertent PHI disclosure is of potential utility in
other developed countries, although the specifics of our
implementation may be less useful.
Disadvantages compared with traditional approaches
The benefit of decreased risk of inadvertent PHI disclosure
from our approach entails three principal disadvantages
compared with routine, centralized collection of identifi-
able data. First, a clinical responder with access to the
locally stored PHI data must be available to provide case
level information when a cluster is detected. It would be
technically straightforward to provide detailed informa-
tion for relevant cases automatically when signals are
detected. We deliberately did not implement this feature
in the current system, since the participating health plans
expressed a strong preference for direct involvement in
this process.
The second disadvantage is the need to pre-specify the
syndromes, age groups, and other data aggregation
parameters in advance, since changing these requires the
distribution of a new release of the aggregation software.
In practice, we have addressed this by means of configura-
Distributed software screen, showing results (synthetic data) after daily processing of encounter records Figure 2
Distributed software screen, showing results (synthetic data) after daily processing of encounter records.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:235 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/235
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tion data for syndrome categories read from a text file as
the application loads, so the application code itself does
not need alteration. This limitation could be largely over-
come by creating a remote query capability to support ad
hoc queries on identifiable data that remains in the con-
trol of the provider.
The third disadvantage is the technical challenge of main-
taining distributed software that must reliably process
data that the programmers are not permitted to examine.
While the software can be exhaustively tested on synthe-
sized data, we have occasionally encountered subtle prob-
lems arising from previously unnoticed errors in the input
data. Our experience suggests that when writing this kind
of distributed application, extensive effort must be
devoted to detecting and clearly reporting errors in the
input data before any processing takes place.
Source code availability
An archive of Python source code for the distributed soft-
ware will be made available by the corresponding author
upon request. Unfortunately no resources are available to
provide technical or other support outside the NDP.
Conclusion
In summary, we have implemented a near real-time syn-
dromic surveillance system that includes automated
detection and reporting to public health agencies of clus-
ters of illness that meet pre-specified criteria for unusual-
ness [5]. This system uses a distributed architecture that
allows the participating health care provider to maintain
full control over potentially identifiable PHI and health
encounter data. The distributed software loads simple text
files that can be created from the data stored in virtually
any proprietary EMR system. It sends summary data suit-
able for signal detection algorithms via a freely available
messaging system, to a datacenter that can manipulate the
aggregated information and combine it with data from
other providers serving the same geographic region, and
which automatically generates and sends alerts when unu-
sual clusters of syndromes are identified. The distributed
software also facilitates efficient access to fully identified
patient information when needed for following up a
potential event.
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